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ABSTRACT In the Internet of Things, based on the collaboration of sensing nodes, sensing data are collected
and transmitted. The collaboration of sensing nodes also plays an important role in the safeguard of the
Internet of Things. Owing to the limited ability of the single sensing node, the threshold authentication based
on the collaboration of sensing nodes can improve the trust of security authentication of sensing nodes. The
current threshold authentication schemesmay require high-computational complexity, andmore importantly,
most of them are instantiated by membership authentication. It’s challenging to apply the current state of
the arts to the case where sensing nodes with various weights join together to fulfill a relatively lightweight
authentication. In this paper, we first design a communication key distribution scheme for sensing networks
based on a symmetric operator. Using the permutation function, the scheme is able to generate characteristic
sequences to improve the efficiency of key distribution in sensing networks. In addition, we propose a
threshold authentication scheme based on weights, in which the higher weight represents the more important
role in authentication. Our authentication scheme only requires lightweight operations, so that, it is extremely
friendly to the IoT nodes with restricted computation power. The security analysis and the case verification
demonstrate that our novel authentication protects IoT nodes without yielding significantly computational
burden to the nodes.
INDEX TERMS Internet of Things, symmetric operator, weighted threshold authentication, threshold
equation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is an advanced framework to connect
a considerable amount of objects (with WiFi or 4G commu-
nication functionalities), in practice, to the Internet, so as
to fill the technical gap between the Internet and the termi-
nal [1]–[10]. Compared with the traditional Internet, IoT may
assemble many heterogeneous sensor networks that make
the network security more sophisticated and further difficult
to be analyzed. Being one of the secure underpinnings of
IoT, security authentication has become a research hotspot
in recent years.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Chunsheng Zhu.
Security authentication is one of the core mechanisms
used in the perceptual layer. Many cryptographic tools are
able to be employed to achieve authentication protocols,
e.g., symmetric-key authentication [11], public-key authen-
tication [12]–[14], key-shared authentication [15], dynamic
user authentication [16], [17] and many others [18]–[24].
Public-key authentication (PKA) mainly includes a hybrid-
key management protocol based on the elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) and the symmetric-key cryptogra-
phy [12], the RSA-based TinyPK authentication scheme [13]
and the distributed public-key authentication cooperative
scheme [14]. A PKA protocol could be deployed in the per-
ceptual layer to guarantee secure authentication among sen-
sor nodes. Due to a large number of exponential operations
incurred by asymmetric encryption technique, the overhead
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of IOT is extremely increased along with the number of
nodes.
Symmetric-key authentication (SKA) consists of several
secure ingredients. For example, security framework protocol
SPINS [11] consists of network security encryption protocol
SNEP, time-based high-tolerant loss packet flow-based pro-
tocolµTESLA, multi-levelµTESLA authentication protocol
and one-way key chain authentication scheme. Different from
heavy computational complexity required by PKA, SKA only
requires lower computation (i.e. low energy consumption),
which is a better candidate for sensor nodes. However, since
all symmetric keys are shared by sensor nodes and sink node,
if sink node has the single node invalidation, all symmetric
keys may leak
In [15], a secret-shared distributed authentication protocol
is proposed to effectively reduce the calculation and energy
consumption in the encryption and decryption stages of per-
ceived nodes. However, it is necessary to design a mechanism
to coordinate information transmission and reception. In [16]
and [17], a dynamic user authentication protocol is proposed,
which uses one-way hash function and logical XOR operation
instead of key encryption, therefore improving the computa-
tion efficiency of nodes. However, as sink node is required
to play the role of information center during authentication,
it will bring a heavy burden for sink node. In addition,
[25]–[29] focus on achieving the balance between the effi-
ciency and the communication cost, but less progress is
obtained.
Since one needs to always balance both limited computing
tasks and computational power of the IoT nodes, the security
and the efficiency are challenging to be achieved at the same
time in the aforementioned authentications. In this paper,
we first design a key distribution scheme for sensing networks
based on symmetric operator. Using the permutation func-
tion, the scheme is able to generate characteristic sequences
to improve the efficiency of key distribution in sensing net-
works. In addition, we propose a threshold authentication
scheme based on weights, which only requires limited oper-
ation complexity, being very friendly to the IoT nodes. The
outline of the paper is described as follows.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
introduces the related work. In section III, we propose a
communication key assignment scheme based on symmetric
operator. Section IV constructs the threshold authentication
scheme based on weights. In Section V, we improve the
threshold authentication scheme based on weights and pro-
pose two improved threshold authentication schemes based
on weights. Finally, we give the conclusion and future work
in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Traditionally, security authentications in IOT focus on per-
ceptual level security, protecting data on transmission among
sensor nodes [30]. The simplest approach to perceptual level
security consists of using a network-wide encryption key,
such that ZigBee authentication [31]. ZigBee also provides
support for cluster and individual link keys. MiniSec [32]
is another well-known security authentication for IOT that
provides data confidentiality, authentication and replay pro-
tection. As with ZigBee, the packet overhead introduced by
MiniSec is in the order of a few bytes. The widespread
TinySec perceptual layer security mechanism is no longer
considered secure [32].
Most security authentications of IOT do not consider a
protocol for key distribution to sensor nodes. Keys are either
loaded onto the nodes before setup or a separate key estab-
lishment protocol is used [33]–[35]. Public key cryptog-
raphy (PKC) is used in traditional computing to facilitate
secure key establishment. However, PKA, in particular the
widespread RSA algorithm, involves too resource consuming
for constrained devices. Some security authentications, such
as Sizzle [36], advocate the use of the more resource efficient
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key cryptosystem.
Other research efforts, such as the secFleck [37] mote, pro-
vide support for faster RSA operations through hardware.
Approaches without PKC often rely on the pre-distribution
of connection keys. Random key pre-distribution schemes,
such as the q-composite scheme [38], establish connections
with a node’s neighbors with a certain probability. Intuitively,
pre-distributed key schemes such as this require a large
amount of keys to be loaded onto the nodes before deploy-
ment. Depending on the method used, this approach is scaling
in O(n2) or O(n), where n is the number of nodes in the net-
work. The Peer Intermediaries for Key Establishment authen-
tication achieves sub linear scaling inO(
p
n) by relying on the
other nodes as trusted intermediaries. While PIKE provides
higher memory efficiency than random schemes, it still leaks
additional key information when motes are captured.
In order to reduce the burden of authentication in sen-
sor networks, end-to-end security authentications have been
widespread studied. Classical end-to-end security authentica-
tions are Sizzle [36], SSNAIL [39] and DTLS [40]. As out-
lined in the introduction, such a authentication protects the
message payload from the data source until it reaches its
target. Because end-to-end authentications are usually imple-
mented in the network or application layer, forwarding nodes
do not need to perform any additional cryptographic opera-
tions since the routing information is transmitted in the clear.
On the flip side, this means end-to-end security protocols
do not provide the same level of protection of a network’s
availability as a perceptual layer protocol could.
Security authentication for single sensor node cannot guar-
antee the trust of this node. Because IOT is vulnerable to net-
work attacks and sensor nodes are vulnerable to be attacked or
be captured. So, threshold authentication is involved to guar-
antee the trust of sensor networks. Only sensor nodes with a
number exceed the threshold can achieve the authentication.
Authentication with sufficiently number of sensor nodes has
more trust compared with authentication with single node.
The threshold cryptography is a technique that the encryp-
tion key or signature key is dispersed into the entity or com-
ponent by secret sharing technology. Only the combination of
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entities or components with no less than a threshold can per-
form an encryption or signature function [41]–[44]. A typical
threshold signature is (k, n) threshold signature [45]–[48],
where only a combination of larger than or equal to k entities
can be signed and otherwise signing leads to a failure. Based
on this technique, in [49], a threshold signature with privilege
set proposed, where only a sufficient number of privileged
set members participating in the signature can form a valid
signature, while any signature that is involved in a privileged
set less than the number of the threshold, even with the partic-
ipation of more ordinary members, cannot be valid. In [50],
a signature scheme based on weighted threshold is proposed.
Each member plays different roles in the signature scheme
dependent on their weights. However, because of using the
Chinese Remainder Theorem in the signature construction,
the scheme requires large number of multiplications and
exponentiation operations in signature, yielding significantly
computational burden to IoT nodes.
Binary symmetric polynomial key distribution is widely
used for secure communication in perceptual networks. The
mechanism works as follows [51]. Select the binary symmet-
ric polynomial f (x, y) =
tP
i,j=0
aijxiyj on the prime field, where
f (x, y) = f (y, x). We suppose ID1, ID2 are the identity of two
perceived nodes.
If f2(x) = f (x, ID2), f1(x) = f (x, ID1), assign the val-
ues to ID1, ID2, respectively. We have the following result,
f1(ID2) = f (ID1, ID2) = f1(ID2, ID1) = f2(ID1). Therefore,
the ID1, ID2 shared secret key is f (ID1, ID2) = f1(ID2, ID1).
Since the design is based on the prime number domain,
the computational complexity of two variables symmetric
polynomial increases rapidly with the increase of threshold,
which limits its practical use in sensing networks.
III. COMMUNICATION KEY ASSIGNMENT BASED
ON SYMMETRIC OPERATOR
A. DEFINITION OF SYMMETRIC OPERATOR
Definition 1: Operator H : Rm  > R is said as symmetric
operator If only: 81  i, j  m, there is:
H (x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xj, . . . , xm)
= H (x1, . . . , xj, . . . , xi, . . . , xm) (1)
Assume that there are L sensing nodes in the sensing
networks, which donated as: N1,N2, . . . . . . .,NL , each of
them has an IDi, i 2 [1,L]. The key distributed manage-
ment center KDS chooses the symmetric operator as the
key generation operator of the whole sensing networks and
delivers the sub symmetric operator for each sensing node:
Hi = H (. . . . . . , IDi, . . . . . .). Then any m nodes in the sens-
ing networks share the key
k = H1(ID1, ID2, ID3, . . . . . . . . . . . . , IDm). (2)
The binary symmetric polynomial also satisfies the prop-
erties of the symmetric operator. In order to improve the
computation efficiency, we illustrate a symmetric operator
based on GF(2n). The basic form of the element in GF(2n)
domain is described as follows:
f (x) =
tX
i=1
ai 1xi 1, ai 2 GF(2n).
g(x) =
tX
i=1
bi 1xi 1, bi 2 GF(2n).
The addition and multiplication formula inGF(2n) domain
is defined as:
f (x)+ g(x) =
tX
i=1
(ai 1   bi 1)xi 1
f (x)⇥ g(x) =
tX
i=1
ai 1xi 1g(x) mod P(x),
where P(x) is the prime polynomial of GF(2n).
B. COMMUNICATION KEY ASSIGNMENT
To improve the efficiency of the identity authentication
between sensing nodes, we propose a hierarchical key assign-
ment scheme based on symmetric operator, which includes
the hierarchical authentication procedure from the cluster
head node to ordinary sensing node as well as the same
procedure from sink node to cluster head node. Suppose there
are n clusters in the sensing networks, and the cluster i has ni
sensing nodes.
1) The key distributed manager KDS selects the
non-degenerate matrix with (n+ 1) order:
Ai =
0@ ai11 . . . ai1mi. . . . . . . . .
aimi1 . . . aimimi
1A, (3)
where 80  i  n, 1  j, k  mi, ai,j,k = ai,k,j.
We let A = {A0, . . . . . . ,An} be the key matrix of the
sensing networks, and the key matrix A can be updated. The
element of the key matrix A is defined in GF(2n).
Assume X ,Y are arbitrary mi dimension vectors, then we
define Hi(X ,Y ) = XTAiY . It is obvious that Hi(X ,Y ) =
XTAiY = YTAiX = Hi(Y ,X ) therefore Hi is symmetric
operator.
2) Suppose that the sink node and all cluster head nodes
are identified as follows: (ID0, ID1, . . . ., IDn), where ID0 is
the sink node and others are cluster head nodes. Assume
that the nodes in the cluster network are identified as
(IDi, IDi,1, . . . ., IDi,ni ), where IDi is the cluster head nodes
identifier, and the rest of them are sensing nodes.
Then the characteristic sequence of each node (sink node,
cluster head node and ordinary node) can be defined as fol-
lows:
Tr(ID) = ((T_ID)1, . . . ., (T_ID)mi )T , (4)
where Tr : R ! Rmi is permutation function. Let Table be
a secure single-byte permutation table, Circle is a circulation
towards the right and C 2 GF(2n) is a constant.
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TABLE 1. Computational comparison between binary symmetric polynomial scheme [51] and ours.
Algorithm 1
Set T_ID1 = ID  C
For (j = 0; j < mi   1; j++)
{
x = Circle(T_IDj, step);
y = x   C;
T_IDj+1 = Table(x);
}
The above characteristic sequence has higher efficiency
than the characteristic sequence (ID1, . . . ., IDmi )T of the
binary symmetric polynomial key distribution scheme.
3) The key distributionmanager KDS generates the authen-
tication key as follows
The authentication key of node IDi between sink node and
cluster head node is
Ki = H0(Tr(IDi), .) = A0Tr(IDi). (5)
The authentication secret key of cluster head node
IDi(i 6= 0) in the cluster network i is
Kˆi = Hi(Tr(IDi), .) = AiTr(IDi). (6)
The authentication secret key of sensing node IDi,j in the
cluster network i is
Kˆi,j = Hi(Tr(IDi,j), .) = AiTr(IDi,j). (7)
The key distribution manager KDS encrypts the authenti-
cation key with the permanent key of member IDi(IDi,j) and
sends it to IDi(IDi,j). IDi(IDi,j) decrypt the message and get
authentication private key. By using this method, any two
members in the group will generate their private key shared
by each other, which donated as:
ki,j = Tr(IDj)TKi = Tr(IDj)T ATr(IDi)
= Tr(IDi)T ATr(IDj) = Tr(IDi)TKj = kj,i. (8)
Since the order of key matrix Ai in the perceptual network
is mi, the proposed scheme is a key management scheme
with threshold property. In order to ensure the unconditional
security of the communication between the sink node and the
cluster head node, we can suppose that
m0   n+ 2. (9)
At this point, even if the sink node as well as all other
cluster nodes is destructed, the key matrix A0 cannot be
completely stolen.
FIGURE 1. The architecture of this paper.
FIGURE 2. Computation comparison w.r.t. generation of characteristic
sequences.
C. COMPUTATION EFFICIENCY COMPARISON
Table 1 illustrates the comparison between the efficiency of
key allocation scheme in this paper and the existing binary
symmetric polynomial key allocation scheme if the number
of the nodes is n and the threshold is m:
In table 1, c ⌧ 1 is a constant, and G, P represent a mod-
ular multiplication on GF(2n) and a prime field respectively.
We know that G < P. It can be predicted from Table 1 that
the efficiency of this scheme is higher than that of the binary
symmetric polynomial key allocation scheme, whether the
KDS generates the authentication private key of all nodes
or the shared private key from one node to other sensing
nodes. Fig.2 illustrates the computations with respect to value
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m, described by two characteristic sequences generated by
the binary symmetric polynomial and the proposed scheme.
As we can see from Fig.2, the computation complexity (The
abscissa unit is P) of the characteristic sequence obtained in
this paper is much lower than that of the binary symmetric
polynomial key allocation scheme. Therefore, the scheme has
better computation efficiency.
Since the Tr(ID) = ((T_ID)1, . . . ., (T_ID)mi )T of differ-
ent ID are scattered randomly, the probability of this charac-
teristic sequence linear associated with any m sensing nodes
is 1/2k , which k is the number of bits of ID.
Then the probability of linear correlation of any m nodes
in M sensing nodes set is:
Pr = C
m
M
2k
.
Considering the practical situation, we set k = 128,
m = 15,M = 200, then we can infer that Pr  2 54, this
value could certainly be ignored.
IV. WEIGHTED THRESHOLD AUTHENTICATION
FOR SENSING NETWORKS
In this section, we propose threshold authentication scheme
based on weights. The higher of weight stands for the more
important role in authentication. Moreover, the proposed
scheme is based on the symmetric operator key assignment
scheme proposed in the previous section. It only uses the
multiplication on the finite polynomial domain to match the
computation power of each sensing node and reduce the
burden of these sensing nodes.
A. BASIC DEFINITION
According to the discussion in section 3, we assume the sens-
ing node setN1, . . . . . . ,Nm with identifiers ID1, . . . . . . , IDm.
The weight of each sensing node Ni is derived from the
V = {V1, . . . . . . ,Vt } (Vi is positive an integer). Each
node has only certain level of weights (which can be
dynamically adjusted), and multiple nodes may have the
same level of weights. We suppose that the sensing nodes
N1, . . . . . . ,Nm have ci sensing nodes with confidence Vi,
the identities of these nodes are IDi1, . . . . . . , ID
i
ci . Define
TVi =  IDi1, . . . . . . , IDici , where TVi is the set of all sensing
nodes with weight Vi in N1, . . . . . . ,Nm.
Definition 2: Sensing nodes N1, . . . . . . ,Nkl complete the
threshold signature together based on weight, if the weight
of the participating nodes is greater or equal to K, which is
expressed as:
x1V1 + . . . . . .+ xtVt   k, (10)
where k is a positive integer which represents the threshold
value.
The proposed scheme becomes a typical (k, n) threshold
signature only if V1 = . . . . . . . = Vt = V0. In another
word, only the union with k/V0 or more sensing nodes can
launch the signature process, which in turn means any union
contained less than k/V0 nodes cannot complete the signature
at all.
If V1   V2 + . . . . . . . + Vt , the scheme in this paper
will become a threshold signature with privilege set V1. That
means the sensing node union which contains the threshold
value of the privilege set V1 or more of that can launch the
signature process. In another word, those unions with less
than the threshold value of the privileged set nodes cannot
complete the signature procedure no matter how many other
nodes participate in.
Suppose that group G is an order q multiplication genera-
tion group with generator g, q is a large prime number which
donated as q = 2n   1, Zq is a domain. H : {0, 1}⇤ ! Zq
is a security-encoded hash function. Obviously GF(2n)\0 is
a 2n   1-order multiplication cyclic group.
B. THRESHOLD AUTHENTICATION WITH WEIGHTS
Consider the weighted authentication scheme of sensing net-
works with threshold equation.
x1V1 + . . . . . . + xtVt   k , V1, . . . . . . ,Vt , k are positive
integer, and V1, . . . . . . ,V are relatively prime. For further
discussion, the threshold equation discussed above is called
an integer weight threshold equation.
1) KEY DISTRIBUTION
The key distribution manager KDS selects the polynomial
f (x) defined on Zq
f (x) = sk +
kX
i=1
at 1xt 1 ,
where f (0) = sk is the shared key. Calculate and distribute
the public key pk = gsk .
Let c =
tP
i=1
min{bciVic , k}.
The key distribution manager KDS selects primary id
id1, . . . . . . , idc (these id are different positive integers), and
establish the key fragments as follows: S1, . . . . . . , Sc.
1) Si = f (idi) i = 1, 2, . . . . . . . . . , c.
2) mi is a minimum positive integer that satisfies miVi   k
pi =
i 1X
j=1
mjVj, 1  i  t,
ki = min{ciVi,miVi}.
The key distribution manager KDS selects key fragments
from Spi+1, . . . . . . , Spi+ki , and deliver them to the sens-
ing nodes in the TVi. Each node obtains Vi key frag-
ments sequentially. That means KDS assigns the key
Spi+Vi(j 1)+1, . . . . . . , Spi+Vij to the node IDij For each node
Ni(i = 1, . . . ,m), KDS chooses single signature key ski,
calculate ri = gski , adds (IDi, ri) in the signature public
information list and sends ski toNi by secure tunnel. Different
from the shared key sk , single-signed key ski needs to be
regenerated in each signature process. In order to reduce the
burden of sensing nodes beyond normal interaction, KDS
uses mass generation or mass-produce techniques.
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2) PROTOCOL DESIGN
Suppose that the sensing nodes N1, . . . . . . ,Nkl participate
in the signature process, where the number of these sensing
nodes in TVi set is c0i.H is the security-encoded hash function.
Then we assume that  i is the Lagrangian multiplier corre-
sponding to the primary identification N1, . . . . . . ,Nkl which
we have mentioned before. A whole threshold authentication
scheme includes the following steps.
1) We suppose that the nodes in TVi set which also partic-
ipate in the signature process are IDi1, . . . . . . ., ID
i
c0i
.
where skij is the private key in single-signed process of ID
i
j.
In summary, IDij calculates s
i
j =
jP
z=1
spi+Vi(j 1)+z in each node
IDij. After that, ID
i
j sends the signature result to Sink node.
2) Sink node collects signature fragment sji of all nodes,
combines them with m and sends this final signature to
the challenge party.
3) The challenger calculates the sum of all signature frag-
ments as s = P sij and verifies this process as follows:
r =
klY
i=1
ri,
gsr = g
P
sij r = g
kP
i=1
 if (idi)H (m)
g
 
klP
i=1
ski
g
klP
i=1
ski
= gf (0)H (m) = pkH (m).
That is gsr = pkH (m).
3) FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
It is obvious that this scheme can cover all possible integer
solutions of the indeterminate equation x1V1+. . . . . .+xtVt  
k . It is pretty clear that any union of the nodes whose sum of
weights is less than the threshold value should not complete
the signature procedure. In another word, the unions whose
sum of weights is equal to the threshold or more than that
could complete the signature procedure. Thus, the scheme
can resist the collusion attack from any union whose sum
of weights is less than the threshold value. Based on the
threshold and discrete logarithm problems, the proof progress
of this scheme is illustrated in detail as follows:
The security analysis is based on the discrete logarithm
problem:
Discrete Logarithm Problem: For large integer group, after
given the random number z 2 G, it is difficult to find r(r > 1)
to satisfy the equation gr = z.
The security proof procedure of the proposed scheme can
be illustrated by the following theorems:
Theorem 1:We assume that there exists an adaptive chosen
message and identity attacker F can break this Each node IDij
computes separately the following formulas.
spi+Vi(j 1)+1 =  pi+Vi(j 1)+1Spi+Vi(j 1)+1H (m),
spi+Vi(j 1)+2 =  pi+Vi(j 1)+2Spi+Vi(j 1)+2H (m),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
spi+Vij =  pi+VijSpi+VijH (m)  skij
scheme in PPT time with probability " which cannot be
ignored. Then there exists an algorithm C who can solve the
problem of discrete logarithm in the PPT time with a proba-
bility " that cannot be ignored. O(") represents " is not less
than a constant which is related to the random oracle function
qH1 , qH2 , qL , with no relation with the safety parameter n.
Proof:We assume that C is a challenger, the goal of C is
eventually output a solution to the discrete logarithm problem
through calling F .
(1) C runs the setup algorithm. Challenger C main-
tains the signature public keys sequence pk1, . . . , pkt ,
and constructs two oracles H1,H2 (The construc-
tion of H1,H2 is shown below). C sends the data
{pk1, . . . , pkt ,H1,H2} to the attacker F as a public
parameter.
(2) H1 inquiring process. C maintains a list HL1 which
contains the arrays {mi, hi} as well as randomly pre-
pares qH1 responses donated as h1, . . . ., hqH1 . When F
accesses theH1 value ofmi, C recovers the {mi, hi} item
from the list HL1 and sends hi to F .
(3) H2 inquiring process. C maintains a list HL2 containing
the arrays {mi,_hi =
klQ
j=1
ri,j} as well as randomly pre-
pares qH2 responses
_
h1, . . . .,
_
hqH2 . When F accesses
H2 value of the mi, C recovers the {mi,_hi} item from
the list HL2 and sends
_
hi to F .
Signature inquiring process. C maintains a list LL contain-
ing qL arrays {mi, si} and F inquiry a signature to sj, and C
checks whether the sj is in the list sj, then recovers the sj item
and sends sj to F .
The attacker F interacts with C , while C outputs its
responses according to the policy above.
When F stops inquiring the result, F outputs a signature
sj related with mi (The signature of mi has never been asked
before), which also satisfies Ver(mj, sj) = 1. C recovers item
{mj, hj} from the list HL1 , and recovers other items {mj,
_
hj}
from the listHL2 . If z = pkH (mj)/
_
hj, then we could predict that
gs = z. That means we finally solve the discrete logarithm
problem.
If z = pkH (mj)/_hj equals to a certainmj that has been asked
before, we can obtain the probability of that is qL2n according
to drawer principle. Therefore, the probability of successfully
solve the discrete logarithm problem by C remains the same,
donated as "0 = O(")+ qL2n = O(").
4) CASE ANALYSIS
We suppose that V = {2, 3} is the weight set of sensing nodes
ID = {1, . . . . . . , 8}. Weighted threshold authentication is
defined as follows:
2x1 + 3x2   7.
We select the following polynomial:
f (x) = 11+ x6 mod 13,
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where f (0) = 11 is the shared key. Let the primary identify
id1, . . . . . . , id20 = 1, . . . . . . , 20, and calculate:
S1 = f (id1) = 12, S2 = f (id20) = 10,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
S19 = f (id19) = 10, S20 = f (id20) = 10.
Denote TV1 = {1, . . . . . . , 4}, TV2 = {5, . . . . . . , 8}. Then
we deliver S1, . . . . . . , S8 to the sensing nodes of TV1, each
node obtains two keys. And deliver S9, . . . . . . , S20 to the
sensing nodes of TV2, each node get three keys.
The core of the threshold signature is the indirect recovery
of the threshold key in the operation procedure. The key
recovery process in this scenario is described as follows: we
assume that (2, 1) is the solution of the equation, in another
words, there are two nodes and a node involved in the key
recovery from TV1 and TV2, respectively. Above all there
are total Si of number 7 involved in key recovery process.
Because the power number of f (x) is 6, key f (0) = 11 is
restored after using the Lagrange theorem.
5) VALIDITY
In Table 2, we compare the efficiency of the proposed scheme
with the existing schemes, with m nodes participated in the
signature and the average weight V0.
TABLE 2. Comparison our scheme with [50].
In the three phases mentioned before, only signature phase
is completed by sensing nodes. E represents exponential
operation of large numbers, k represents the threshold. Set
id1, id2, . . . . . . = 1, 2, . . . . . . , that is, the primary identify is
integer series beginning with 1, and V0(k + 1)⌧ E .
We can see from table 2, the computation complexity of
the proposed scheme, especially the signature phase per-
formed by the sensing nodes, is much lower than that of the
scheme [50], and it can match the computational power of the
sensing nodes.
As we can see from Fig.3, the computation complexity
(The abscissa unit is E) of the signature phase is much lower
than that of scheme [50]. For example, when the average
weight of sensor nodes is 50, the average calculations of
scheme [50] is about 50E, however the average calculations
of the proposed method is about 2.5E, which is much lower
than scheme [50]. Therefore, the scheme has better computa-
tion efficiency.
V. IMPROVED WEIGHTED THRESHOLD
AUTHENTICATION FOR SENSING NETWORKS
In the previous section, we propose a weighted authentica-
tion scheme with integer weight threshold. It can solve the
FIGURE 3. Computation comparison w.r.t. the generation of characteristic
sequence.
problem of joint verification of nodes with different weighted
levels, and it is more efficient compared with those existed
signature schemes. However, we can see from Table 1 that the
burden of sensing nodeswas rising rapidlywith the increasing
range of weights V = {V1, . . . . . . ,Vt }. For instance: consid-
ering the following threshold equation:
77x1 + 91x2 + 143x3   2002.
Now, the key management center exploits those polynomi-
als with 2002 power to assign the sub keys to each sensing
node. That means the calculation of multiplication have to
allocate on average, which could create burden for each sens-
ing node.
Transform the formula above through divided by about
1001 inequality, and then we get:
x1
13
+ x2
11
+ x3
7
  2.
The related parameters of this threshold equation are
much smaller than those of the original equation. Therefore,
we focus on a more efficient threshold proof scheme for the
above equations in this section.
A. THRESHOLD AUTHENTICATION BASED
ON FRACTION WEIGHTS
Considering fraction-basedweights threshold equation as fol-
lows:
x1
M1
+ . . . . . .+ xt
Mt
  k (11)
whereM1, . . . . . . ,Mt , k are positive integers andM1, . . . . . . ,
Mt are inter-prime. The threshold equation with integer
weights corresponding to the fraction-based weights thresh-
old equation is expressed as:
M2, . . . ,Mrx1 + . . . . . .+M1, . . . ,Mt 1xt   kM1, . . . ,Mt
According to the description in 4.1, TVi is subset of sensing
nodes set N1, . . . . . . ,Nm, whose weights are
M1 · · ·Mi 1 ·Mi+1 · · ·Mt .
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In order to describe more clearly in the subsequent sec-
tions, TVi is defined as a set of sensing nodes corresponding
to xi, with the size of this set is ci.
1) KEY DISTRIBUTION
The key distribution manager KDS exploits the polynomial
f (x) defined on Zq which donated as:
f (x) = sk +
kX
i=1
at 1xt 1 .
Weassume that f (0) = sk is the shared key. KDS calculates
and published the public key pk = gsk .
Suppose that:
c =
tX
i=1
min{bci/Mic ,k}.
The key distribution managers exploit primary identity
id1, . . . . . . , idc to generate the key fragments S1, . . . . . . , Sc
as follows:
1) Si = f (idi) 1  i  c,
2) We suppose that:
pi =
i 1X
j=1
min
 ⌅
cj/Mj
⇧
, k
 
1  i  t
ki = min  ⌅ci/Mi⇧ , .k .
3) The key distribution manager exploits the key fragments
Spi+1, . . . . ., Spi+ki to generate the key again, then deliver the
fragments to the nodes in the TVi in turn. The polynomial
selected by the key distributionmanager KDS is expressed as:
fpi+1(x) = Spi+1 + api+1,1x
+ . . . . .+ api+1,Mi qi 1xMi qi 1,
fpi+2(x) = Spi+2 + api+2,1x
+ . . . . .+ api+2,2Mi qi 1x2Mi qi 1,
fpi+ki (x) = Spi+ki + api+ki,1x
+ . . . . .+ api+ki,kiMi qi 1xkiMi qi 1.
For each node IDij in TVi set, we calculate that
Sjpi+1 = fpi+1(IDij),
Sjpi+2 = fpi+2(IDij),
Sjpi+ki = fpi+ki (IDij).
Deliver the Sjpi+1, . . . . ., S
j
pi+ki to the node ID
i
j.
For each node Ni(i = 1, . . . ,m), we use KDS to select a
single-signed key ski and calculate ri = gski . Then we add
(IDi, ri) item to the public signature list and send ski to Ni
through the secure channel. Different from the generation
of shared key, a single-signed key sk is generated in each
signature generating process. In order to reduce the burden
in each sensing node beyond normal interaction, KDS uses
mass generation or mass-produce techniques.
2) PROTOCOL DESIGN
Suppose that the sensing nodes N1, . . . . . . ,Nkl participate
in the signature process, where the number of these sensing
nodes in TVi set is c0i.H is the security-encoded hash function.
Then we assume that  i is the Lagrangian multiplier corre-
sponding to the primary identification N1, . . . . . . ,Nkl which
we have mentioned before. Our construction is described as
follows.
1) Select fpi+1 · ·, fpi+c0i/Mi as the polynomials that partic-
ipate in signature procedure.
We suppose that the sensing nodes participated in signature
process in TVi are IDi1, . . . . . . , ID
i
c0i
and then we compute as
follows:
The Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the first Mi
nodes are  pi+1,j,
The Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the first 2Mi
nodes are  pi+2,j,
The Lagrange multipliers of all nodes are  pi+c0i/Mi,j.
For each node IDij, we calculate that:
spi+bj/Mic+1 =  pi+bj/Mic+1 pi+bj/Mic+1,jfpi+bj/Mic+1
⇥(IDij)H (m),
spi+bj/Mic+2 =  pi+bj/Mic+2 pi+bj/Mic+2,jfpi+bj/Mic+2
⇥(IDij)H (m),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
spi+ki =  pi+ki pi+ki,jfpi+ki (IDij)H (m)  skij .
skij is the single-signed key of ID
i
j, and the node ID
i
j
calculates
sij =
pi+kiX
z=pi+bj/Mic+1
sz.
The node IDij sends the signature result s
i
j to Sink node.
2) Sink node collects all signature fragments V = {3, 5}
of all nodes, combines them with V = {3, 5} and sends
this final signature to the challenger party.
3) The challenger calculates the sum of all signature frag-
ments, donated as s = P sij and verifies this process as
gSr , shown at the bottom of this page. This procedure
can also be expressed as: gsr = pkH (m).
gSr = g
PP
Vi
P
 pi+bj/Mic+zlambdapi+bj/Mic+z,jf pi+bj/Mic+z(ID
i
j)H (m)g 
Pkl
i=1 ski g 
Pkl
i=1 ski=g 
Pkl
i=1  if (idi)H (m)
= gf (0)H (m) = pkH (m)
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3) FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
It is obvious that any x1, . . . , . . . , xt satisfied the equation 
x1
M1
⌫
+ . . . . . .+
 
xt
Mt
⌫
  kc
can obtain k values of f (x), so the signature process can be
achieved. According to the features of key distribution, sig-
nature combinations that do not satisfy the threshold equation
will not have enough key fragments. Moreover, they cannot
be encrypted, signed and execute other steps. Therefore, this
program can resist any collusion attack that is less than the
threshold value.
4) CASE ANALYSIS
We suppose that V = {3, 5} is the weights set of the sens-
ing nodes ID = {1, . . . . . . , 8}. Threshold authentication is
defined as follows:
3x1 + 5x2   30.
The equation is divided by 15 on both sides:
x1
5
+ x2
3
  2.
Let f (x) = 7 + 4x mod 13, where f (x) = 7 is the shared
key.
Let the primary identify id1, . . . . . . , idc = 1, 2, 3, 4, and
we calculate that:
S1 = f (id1) = 11.
S2 = f (id2) = 2.
S3 = f (id3) = 6.
S4 = f (id4) = 10.
Let TV1 = {1, . . . . . . , 5}, TV2 = {6, . . . . . . , 11}, and
define the following polynomials:
f1(x) = 11+
5X
i=2
a1,ixi 1,
f2(x) = 2+
10X
i=2
a2,ixi 1,
f3(x) = 6+
3X
i=2
a3,ixi 1,
f4(x) = 10+
6X
i=2
a4,ixi 1,
For each node IDi 2 TV1, the key distributed to this node
is f1(IDi)f2(IDi).
For each node IDi 2 TV2, the key distributed to this node
is f3(IDi)f4(IDi).
The core technique of the threshold signature procedure is
the indirect recovery of the threshold key in the operation. The
key recovery process for this scenario is illustrated as follows:
We assume that there are five nodes in TV1 and three nodes
in TV2, respectively involved in the key recovery process. The
key recovery process is described in the followings:
TABLE 3. Comparison our scheme with [50].
First of all, the five nodes in TV1 exploit Lagrangian mul-
tiplier method to recover the eleventh key of f1(x), then the
three nodes in TV2 take advantage of Lagrangian multiplier
method to recover the key of f3(x). Finally, we use 6 and 11 to
get f (0) = 7 by Lagrangian multiplier method.
5) VALIDITY
In Table 3 we compare the efficiency of the proposed scheme
with the existing scheme, with m nodes participated in the
signature and the average of Mi is M0.
In the three phases mentioned before, only signature phase
is completed by sensing nodes. E represents exponential
operation of large numbers, k represents the threshold. Set
id1, id2, . . . . . . = 1, 2, . . . . ., that is, the primary identify is
integer series beginning with 1, and M0(k + 1)⌧ E .
We can see from table 3, the computation complexity of
the proposed scheme, especially the signature phase per-
formed by the sensing nodes, is much lower than that of the
scheme [50], and it can match the computational power of the
sensing nodes.
B. THRESHOLD AUTHENTICATION BASED
ON HYBRID WEIGHTS
Consider the threshold equation of hybrid weights, which is
donated as:
b1x1 + q1
M1
+ . . . . . .+ btxt + qt
Mt
  k. (12)
We suppose thatM1, . . . . . . ,Mt , b1, . . . . . . , bt , q1, . . . . . . ,
qt , k are positive integers, andM1, . . . . . . ,Mt are inter-prime
while b1, . . . . . . , bt , k are inter-prime as well. The threshold
equation of hybrid weights can be transformed into an integer
weight threshold equation, which is donated as:
b1M2, . . . ,Mtx1 + . . . . . .+ btM1, . . . ,Mt 1xt
  kM1, . . . ,Mt q1M2, . . . ,Mt   . . . .  qtM1, . . . ,Mt 1.
TVi is a set of sensing nodes corresponding to xi, and the size
of this set is ci.
1) KEY DISTRIBUTION
First of all, the key distribution manager KDS exploits the
polynomial f (x) defined on Zq, which is donated as:
f (x) = sk +
kX
i=1
at 1xt 1 ,
where f (0) = sk is the shared key. KDS calculates and
publish the public key pk = gsk .
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Denote
c =
tX
i=1
min{bbi(ci + qi)/Mic , k}.
Choose the primary identity id1, . . . . . . , idc, and generate
the key fragments S1, . . . . . . , Sc in the following steps.
Si = f (idi), 1  i  c,
1) Then we denote
pi =
i 1X
j=1
min{⌅bi(cj + qj) Mj⇧ ,k}, 1  i  t,
ki = min{bbi(ci + qi)/Mic , k},
kˆi = min{b(ci + qi)/Mic , dk/bie}.
2) The key distribution managers exploit the key frag-
ments, which is donated as Spi+1, . . . . ., Spi+ki to gen-
erate the key again, then delivers the fragments to the
nodes in the TVi in turn. The polynomial selected by
the key distribution manager KDS is expressed as:
fpi+1(x) = Spi+1 + api+1,1x
+ . . . . .+ api+1,Mi qi 1xMi qi 1,
fpi+2(x) = Spi+2 + api+2,1x
+ . . . . .+ api+2,2Mi qi 1x2Mi qi 1,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
fpi+kˆi (x) = Spi+kˆ + api+kˆ,1x
+ . . . . .+ api+kˆ,kˆiMi qi 1xkˆiMi qi 1.
For each node IDij in TVi, we calculate
Sjpi+1 = fpi+1(IDij), S
j
pi+2
= fpi+1(IDij + 1), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,
Sjpi+bi = fpi+1(IDij + bi   1),
Sjpi+bi+1 = fpi+2(IDij), S
j
pi+bi+2
= fpi+2(IDij + 1), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,
Sjpi+2bi = fpi+2(IDij + bi   1),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Sjpi+(ci 1)bi+1 = fpi+kˆ (IDij), S
j
pi+(ci 1)bi+2
= fpi+kˆ (IDij + 1), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,
Sjpi+ki = fpi+kˆ (IDij + bi   1).
Deliver Sjpi+1, . . . . ., S
j
pi+kˆi to the nodes ID
i
j.
For each node Ni (i = 1, . . . ,m), KDS selects a single-
signed key ski, then we calculate ri = gski , add (IDi, ri)
to the public signature list and send ski to Ni by the secure
channel. Different from the generation of shared key, a single-
signed key sk is generated in each signature generating pro-
cess. In order to reduce the burden in each sensing node
beyond normal interaction, KDS uses mass generation or
mass-produce techniques.
2) PROTOCOL DESIGN
Suppose that the sensing nodes N1, . . . . . . ,Nkl participate
in the signature process, where the number of these sensing
nodes in TVi set is c0i.H is the security-encoded hash function.
Then we assume that  i is the Lagrangian multiplier corre-
sponding to the primary identification N1, . . . . . . ,Nkl which
we have mentioned before. A whole threshold authentication
scheme includes the following steps.
1) As the number of nodes participating in signature pro-
cedure is c0i, for each node in TVi, we select polynomials
fpi+1, .., fpi+bic0i/Mi and calculate the following values:
The Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the first Mi
nodes:  pi+1,j are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding
to the IDi1, . . . . . . , ID
i
Mi ,  pi+2,j are the Lagrange multipli-
ers corresponding to IDi1 + 1, . . . . . . , IDiMi + 1, . . . pi+bi,j
are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to IDi1 + bi  
1, . . . . . . , IDiMi + bi   1.
The Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the first 2Mi
nodes are expressed as follows:  pi+bi+1,j are Lagrange
multipliers corresponding to IDi1, . . . . . . , ID
i
2Mi ,  pi+bi+2,j
are Lagrange multipliers corresponding to IDi1 + 1, . . . . . . ,
IDi2Mi +1, . . . ,  pi+2bi,j are Lagrange multipliers correspond-
ing to IDi1 + bi   1, . . . . . . , IDi2Mi + bi   1.
The Lagrange multipliers of all nodes participated in
signature procedure in TVi are expressed as follows:
 pi+(c0 1)bi+1,j are Lagrange multipliers corresponding to
IDi1, . . . . . . , ID
i
c0i
, . pi+(c0 1)bi+2,j are Lagrange multipliers
corresponding to IDi1 + 1, . . . . . . , IDic0i + 1, .. . . pi+c0bi,j are
Lagrange multipliers corresponding to
IDi1 + bi   1, . . . . . . , IDic0i + bi   1.
For each node IDij in TVi, we calculate that
spi+bbi(j 1)/Mic+1
=  pi+bbi(j 1)/Mic+1 pi+bbi(j 1)/Mic+1,j
⇥ fpi+b(j 1)/Mic+1(IDij)H (m),
spi+bbi(j 1)/Mic+2
=  pi+bbi(j 1)/Mic+2 pi+bbi(j 1)/Mic+2,j
⇥ fpi+b(j 1)/Mic+1(IDij + 1)H (m),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
spi+bbi(j 1)/Mic+bi
=  pi+bbi(j 1)/Mic+bi pi+bbi(j 1)/Mic+bi,j
⇥ fpi+b(j 1)/Mic+1(IDij + bi   1)H (m),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
spi+b(c0 1)bi/Mic+1
=  pi+b(c0 1)bi/Mic+1 pi+b(c0 1)bi/Mic+1
⇥ fpi+kˆi (IDij)H (m),
spi+b(c0 1)bi/Mic+2
=  pi+b(c0 1)bi/Mic+2 pi+b(c0 1)bi/Mic+2
⇥ fpi+kˆi (IDij + 1)H (m),
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
sjpi+ki =  pi+ki pi+ki,jfpi+kˆi (IDij + bi   1)H (m)  skij .
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r =
klY
i=1
ri,
gsr = g
PP
Vi
P
 pi+bbi(j 1)/Mic+z pi+bbi(j 1)/Mic+z,jfpi+b(j 1)/Mic+z/bi (IDij+z/bi)H (m)
g
 
klP
i=1
ski
g
 
klP
i=1
ski
= g
kP
i=1
 if (idi)H (m)
= gf (0)H (m) = pkH (m).
Assume that skij is the single-signed key of ID
i
j, and for
node IDij we calculate
sij =
pi+kiX
pi+bbi(j 1)/Mic+1
sz.
Then node IDij will send the signature result s
i
j to Sink node.
2) Sink node collects all signature fragments sji of all
nodes, combines them with m and sends this final
signature to the challenger party.
3) The challenger the sum of all signature fragments,
donated as s = P sij and verifies this process as r and
gsr , shown at the top of this page, which can be also
indicated as gsr = pkH (m).
3) FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
It is obvious that any x1, . . . . . . , xt satisfying the equation 
b1(x1 + q1)
M1
⌫
+ . . . . . .+
 
bt (xt + qt )
Mt
⌫
  k,
can get nc values of f (x), so the signature process can
complete successfully. According to the characteristics of
key distribution, signature combinations that do not satisfy
the threshold equation will not have enough key fragments.
Moreover, they cannot be encrypted, signed and execute other
steps. Therefore, this scheme can resist any collusion attack
that is less than the threshold value.
4) CASE ANALYSIS
We consider the following threshold equation with hybrid
weight
2x1
3
+ 3x2 + 1
5
+ 5x2 + 1
7
  2,
Whose corresponding integer equation is:
70x1 + 63x2 + 75x3   174
Denote
f (x) = 7+ 4x mod 13,
where f (x) = 7 is the shared key.
Let the primary identify id1, . . . . . . , idc = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
and then calculate
S1 = f (id1) = 11, S2 = f (id2) = 2,
S3 = f (id3) = 6, S4 = f (id4) = 10,
S5 = f (id5) = 1, S6 = f (id6) = 5.
Let TV1 = {1, . . . . . . , 3}, TV2 = {4 . . . . . . , 9}, TV3 =
{10, . . . . . . , 16}, and define the polynomials as follows:
f1(x) = 11+
3X
i=2
a1,ixi 1,
f2(x) = 2+
6X
i=2
a2,ixi 1,
f3(x) = 6+
4X
i=2
a3,ixi 1,
f4(x) = 10+
9X
i=2
a4,ixi 1,
f5(x) = 1+
6X
i=2
a5,ixi 1,
f6(x) = 5+
13X
i=2
a6,ixi 1.
The keys distributed to each node IDi 2 TV1 are
expressed as:
f1(IDi), f1(IDi + 1).
f2(IDi), f2(IDi + 1).
The keys distributed to each node IDi 2 TV2 are
expressed as:
f3(IDi), f3(IDi + 1), f3(IDi + 2),
f4(IDi), f4(IDi + 1), f4(IDi + 2).
The keys distributed to each node IDi 2 TV3, are
expressed as:
f5(IDi), f5(IDi + 1), f5(IDi + 2), f5(IDi + 3),
f5(IDi + 4), f6(IDi), f6(IDi + 1), f6(IDi + 2),
f6(IDi + 3), f6(IDi + 4),
The core technique of the threshold signature procedure is
the indirect recovery of the threshold key during operations.
The key recovery process for this scenario is illustrated as
follows:
30122 VOLUME 7, 2019
Z. Ning et al.: TAW: Cost-Effective Threshold Authentication With Weights for IoT
We assume that there are 2 nodes in TV1 as well as 2 nodes
in TV2 involved in the key recovery process with no node
in TV3 involved in the same process. The key recovery is
described in the following steps:
First of all, the 2 nodes in TV1 exploit Lagrangian mul-
tiplier method to recover the eleventh key of f1(x), then
the 2 nodes in TV2 take advantage of Lagrangian multiplier
method to recover the sixth key of f3(x). Finally, we use 6 and
11 to get f (0) = 7 by Lagrangian multiplier method.
For other solutions of the same equation such as (2, 0, 2)
and (0, 2, 2). The recovery method is same as we mentioned
before.
5) VALIDITY
In Table 4 we compare the efficiency of the proposed scheme
with the existing scheme, with m nodes participated in the
signature and the average of biMi is Mb.
TABLE 4. Comparison our scheme with [50].
In the three phases mentioned before, only signature phase
is completed by sensing nodes. E represents exponential
operation of large numbers, k represents the threshold. Set
id1, id2, . . . . . . = 1, 2, . . . . ., that is, the primary identify is
integer series beginning with 1, and Mb(k + 1)⌧ E .
We can see from table 3, the computation complexity of
the proposed scheme, especially the signature phase per-
formed by the sensing nodes, is much lower than that of the
scheme [50], and it can match the computational power of the
sensing nodes.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Due to the higher complexity and the work by the equality
of members, the existing threshold authentication schemes
cannot be suitable to the circumstance with various sens-
ing nodes. In this paper, we firstly propose key distribution
scheme in sensing networks based on symmetric operators.
By the permutation function, the proposed scheme could
generate feature sequences to improve the efficiency of key
distribution in the sensing networks. In addition, we propose
a weighed threshold authentication scheme based on weight
value level. The higher the weight of the sensing node is,
the greater the role of the node plays, and vice versa. The
proposed scheme only uses finite multiplicative operations,
which can match the computing power of the sensing nodes
and reduce the burden of each sensing nodes.
In future, we will mainly focus on the improvement of
threshold authentication scheme based on weights to be
adapted to different applications of IoT.
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